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Abstract 
 
Despite differences in corporate governance systems in the United States and Australia, 
the corporate governance failures that led to each country’s largest bankruptcy are 
strikingly similar.  WorldCom in the United States and HIH Insurance in Australia were 
both created by a rapid series of major acquisitions, failed after their last major 
acquisitions, and attempted to hide their declining performance with aggressive and/or 
fraudulent accounting practices.  In this paper we present a clinical examination of the 
corporate governance failures that led to the demise of HIH Insurance and show that 
corporate governance failures are not endemic to the existing corporate governance 
system in the United States. 
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Beware the Ides of March: The Collapse of HIH Insurance 
 
1. Introduction  
The collapse of HIH Insurance in March 2001 is the biggest financial collapse in 
Australia’s corporate history. As of March 15, 2001, liquidators estimated that the 
deficiency for the HIH Group is between $3.6 billion and $5.3 billion.1  Six months 
before its collapse, HIH Insurance was Australia’s second biggest insurer. As a publicly 
traded stock, HIH Insurance had only a ten-year history – growing rapidly through a 
series of acquisitions.  The failure of HIH is largely attributable to its last major 
acquisition, FAI Insurance, and its aggressive accounting practices.  Despite the decline 
of HIH, its CEO received a multimillion dollar severance package when he resigned in 
the year before its bankruptcy.  The fallout since the HIH collapse has been immense 
because it has triggered a rise in global reinsurance premiums. Domestically, the HIH 
collapse has impacted housing construction where builders who had previously been 
covered by HIH had to seek replacement coverage. The collapse also deprived 
approximately half of Australia’s doctors of malpractice insurance and thousands of 
small businesses lost liability coverage.   
WorldCom is the largest bankruptcy in US history.  Prior to its collapse in 2002, 
WorldCom was a leading telecommunications giant and the second largest provider of 
long distance services in the US.  WorldCom’s bankruptcy was due in large part to one of 
its last major acquisitions, MCI Communications, and fraudulent accounting practices.  
WorldCom was created from a merger between two communications companies in 1993 
and grew exponentially through dozens of acquisitions over its nine year history.  The 
CEO of WorldCom also received a multimillion dollar severance package upon his 
                                                          
1 All values and prices throughout this article are expressed in Australian dollars unless stated otherwise. 
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resignation in the months before the bankruptcy that led to thousands of layoffs and cast 
further doubts on the strength of the domestic and international telecommunications 
industry. 
The parallels between the histories and failures of HIH and WorldCom are 
striking, especially given that the companies were located in countries with differing 
corporate governance systems.  In this paper we analyze the corporate governance 
failures that aided the collapse of HIH and their similarities to the same failures at 
WorldCom.  Specifically, we examine the similarities and differences between Australian 
corporate governance mechanisms and those in place in other developed markets and the 
role these mechanisms played in the failure of HIH.  We then highlight the elements of 
corporate governance which were ineffective in the case of HIH and show how these 
elements may be used to identify corporate governance weaknesses in other Australian 
firms and corporations in other developed countries.   
The remainder of our study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a 
comparison of corporate governance systems in place in major developed markets, 
Section 3 details the industry and firm-specific factors relevant to the demise of HIH, 
Section 4 highlights the corporate governance failures that led to the collapse of HIH, and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Overview of Developed Countries’ Corporate Governance Systems 
As LaPorta et al (2000) show, corporate governance systems are the strongest (or 
most effective) in those countries offering the highest levels of legal protection to 
stockholders.  Among these countries with the highest levels of legal protection, the 
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United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and Japan have been compared 
and contrasted for their differences in corporate governance systems.  Of interest in 
comparative studies is why these developed countries have such variance in their 
corporate governance systems and the advantages and disadvantages to each system. 
While different in some aspects, corporate governance systems in the US and UK 
(and Canada as well) are more similar than different and researchers often classify them 
as the same when compared to systems in place in Germany and Japan [see Kaplan 
(1994a, 1994b)].2  The defining characteristics of this “Anglo-American” corporate 
governance system is its external mechanisms and open market orientation.  These two 
characteristics are intertwined to form an active external market for corporate control and 
managerial labor.  As Manne (1965) points out, poor corporate governance will lead to a 
depressed stock price and a takeover opportunity whereby managers of the acquired firm 
are replaced.  Fama (1980) furthers this concept of external market discipline with his 
theory of “ex post settling up”.  Under this theory, managers who have been terminated 
because of their firms’ poor performance face a harsh labor market and generally do not 
achieve the same level of status or compensation as before the termination.  These 
external market mechanisms are designed to encourage managers to act in shareholders’ 
best interests.  Corporate governance changes may occur rapidly in the Anglo-American 
model, causing Kaplan (1994a) to term this model a “short term” corporate governance 
system. 
Other characteristics common in the US/UK model include a single board of 
directors with a mix of management (inside) and non-management (outside) members.  
                                                          
2 The US and UK are becoming closer given the similar recommendations of the Cadbury and Hampel 
Committees in the UK and the revised 2002 listing requirements in the US. 
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The chief executive officer (CEO) almost always serves on the board – often as 
chairman.3  In the UK, and increasingly in the US, the boards’ audit and compensation 
committees are comprised of outside directors.  CEOs are generally shareholders in their 
firms, but the levels of holdings vary greatly.  
In contrast, the German and Japanese corporate governance systems are better 
described as long-term relationship models.  External control mechanisms are minimal, 
but shareholdings are more concentrated – often held by financial institutions with a 
major presence on firms’ boards.  In Germany the board structure is bifurcated into a 
supervisory and management board.  This is somewhat similar to the Anglo 
board/management structure but with notable exceptions.  First, the two boards are 
mutually exclusive.  Thus, the supervisory board, which oversees the management board, 
is a board of strictly outside directors.  Second, the supervisory board appoints and 
charges the management board.  This differs from the Anglo model where the CEO 
generally has some, or even total, control over the selection of the board of directors.  
Third, CEOs in Germany tend to have less absolute power over their corporations than in 
the US/UK model.4 
The CEO and/or chairman of the board also has less power in Japanese corporate 
governance systems where decision by consensus is the norm.  Board structure and 
function is different from both the Anglo and German models.  Dominated by inside 
directors, the boards of Japanese companies are largely made up of current and former 
employees who tend to have negligible ownership stakes in the firm.  As in the German 
system, shareholdings are concentrated and institutional ownership is higher than in the 
                                                          
3 Although the dual CEO/chairman role is becoming less frequent in both countries. 
4 For further comparisons, see John and Senbet (1998). 
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US/UK.  However, institutional shareholders tend to be less proactive in the Japanese 
system.5 
Australia is a developed country with a corporate governance system combining 
elements of both the external and internal control mechanisms described above.  The 
general structure of the Australian corporate governance system is a hybrid of the Anglo-
American, German, and Japanese models.  As pointed out by Suchard et al (2001), 
Australian corporate governance mixes the Anglo board structure with the internal 
“relationship” corporate governance mechanisms seen in Germany and Japan.  Australian 
firms have a single board of directors comprised of inside and outside members.  
Following the 1991 Bosch Report, directors are classified into three categories: 
executives, independent non-executives, and non-independent non-executives.  The 
dichotomy of classification of non-executives relies on a comprehensive list of current 
and past relationships between the director and firm.  Directors are deemed independent 
only if they have no current or prior relationship with the firm as an employee, 
professional advisor, or having no other contractual relationship to the company. 
However, Australian firms tend to have less diffuse shareholdings than in the US 
and UK.  Australian markets also differ in that hostile takeovers are rare and not viewed 
as a source of external discipline as in the US/UK model.  Rather, the few blockholders  
with the large concentrations of shares are expected to serve as monitors of the firm much 
as in the case in Germany and Japan.  This mixture of a board structure designed to be 
monitored by open and external governance mechanisms with closed and internal 
monitoring mechanisms has led some to question the effectiveness of the Australian 
                                                          
5 For further comparisons, see Kang and Shivdasani (1995). 
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corporate governance system.6  The HIH collapse highlights some of the shortcomings of 
the Australian corporate governance system. 
 
3. Relevant Industry and Firm Information 
3.1 The Australian Insurance Industry 
The Australian insurance industry represents 2% of the international market in 
general insurance and is ranked the 11th largest market in the world. For the year ending 
2000 there were 161 Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) licensed private 
sector insurers and reinsurers writing insurance inside Australia. Panel A of Table 1 
indicates how these private sector insurers are classified.  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 1 also provides details regarding the insurance industry as a whole.  1999 
was not a particularly good year for the insurance industry due to a series of natural 
disasters.  However, 2000 proved to be a much better year.  Despite the improving 
economic environment, insurer New Cap Re failed while others struggled significantly 
(e.g. Reinsurance Australia Corporation and GIO Insurance).  In the following year, HIH 
Insurance, Australia’s second largest insurer, went into provisional liquidation. 
 The US telecommunications industry, while not so affected by events of nature, 
witnessed a severe decline beginning in the late 1990s.  Sources of financing so readily 
available in earlier years to WorldCom, industry leader AT&T,  and even upstarts such as 
Global Crossing for financing their acquisition programs and/or capital investments dried 
up as the capital markets realized that the long distance business was in decline, prior 
acquisitions had not lived up to promised potential, and the quality of certain telecom 
                                                          
6 Reference FT article here. 
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assets (especially fiber optics) were coming under increasing scrutiny.  Global Crossing 
preceded WorldCom to bankruptcy by a matter of months in 2002. 
 
3.2 The History of HIH Insurance 
HIH Insurance began in 1968 when Ray Williams and Michael Payne established 
MW Payne Underwriting Agency Pty. Ltd in Australia.  After being acquired by a British 
insurer in 1971, the firm that became HIH was spun-off as a publicly-traded firm on the 
Australian Stock Exchange in 1992.  Through a decade of multiple acquisitions, mergers, 
and name changes, HIH diversified into many insurance sectors with operations in 
multiple countries. Table 2 provides a detailed history. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 By 2001, the HIH group consisted of 217 subsidiaries with operations in a number of 
countries. Within the HIH group the three largest licensed insurance companies were 
HIH Casualty and General Insurance Limited, FAI General Insurance Company Limited 
and CIC Insurance Limited. HIH Insurance Limited was the listed holding company. 
Prior to its collapse, HIH Insurance’s principal activities in Australia and internationally 
were general insurance underwriting, the operation of insurance underwriting agencies, 
investment funds management, financial services and property. The company also 
managed workers’ compensation schemes in New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia. 
 Evidence of HIH’s aggressive approach to accounting surfaced as early as 1992 in 
a due diligence report by Ernst and Young performed for CIC Holdings while in merger 
talks with CE Heath International (an earlier version of HIH).  Heath was found to have 
 8
understated liabilities by $18 million and under-reserved by $41 million (much of this 
sum constitutes a “prudential margin”, a very common prudent insurance company 
practice of reserving approximately 20% more capital beyond what is necessary to cover 
expected liabilities).7  
Ray Williams, CEO of Heath, disagreed with the need for a prudential margin.  A 
second report by an independent expert was drafted and recommended that the merger 
still take place.  The independent expert was Alan Davies of the public accounting firm 
Arthur Andersen.  Davies later became HIH’s lead auditor in 1996 when the former 
auditor, Dominic Fodera, became HIH’s finance director.8  
Similarly, WorldCom had been accused by former employees of accounting 
improprieties for overbooking revenue and not writing off bad accounts receivable in a 
lawsuit that was dismissed a couple of years prior to the bankruptcy.  The controller and 
CFO were later indicted for accounting fraud for understating expenses by more than 
US$ 3 billion.  Arthur Andersen also served as the auditor of WorldCom. 
Despite the aggressive accounting and the potential agency issues with auditors, 
the beginning of the end of HIH focuses on a particular acquisition in 1998.  HIH 
initiated a formal takeover of domestic insurer FAI Insurance Ltd. in September 1998, 
completing the takeover in January 1999.  According to its annual report, HIH’s strategy 
was to secure a major market share position in the Australian general insurance industry 
and to diversify its distribution channels. A major stakeholder in FAI, the Adler family, 
sold their 45 million shares, or 14.2% stake, in FAI to HIH for $34 million.  HIH 
Insurance announced it had purchased the Adler family stake and would make a bid for 
                                                          
7 See Sykes (2002b). 
8 See Main (2002a) for more detail on these relationships. 
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the remaining shares of the company. The terms of the offer were one HIH share and 
$2.25 cash for every six FAI shares.  At the time, this would value FAI at approximately 
$300 million. At the time of the proposed acquisition, HIH announced that it intended to 
retain FAI’s personal lines insurance business as a discrete unit within HIH and would 
retain the FAI brand name in its retail operations.  The reinsurance program would also 
be consolidated, both companies’ corporate insurance portfolios would be merged, and 
the IT systems would be integrated.  After the FAI takeover, the HIH group accounted for 
more than 10 percent of the general insurance business in Australia.  Rodney Adler, CEO 
of FAI, was then named a director at HIH.  
In early 1999, HIH announced that it had suffered a 39% profit plunge in the year 
through December.  Declining premium rates, record low interest rates and the second 
worst year on record for natural disasters were given as reasons for the profit plunge. 
Such disasters included storm and flood damage along Australia’s East Coast, 
Hurricanes’ George and Mitch, Canadian ice storms, and a large scale power outage in 
New Zealand. As a result of these disasters, claims expenses increased sharply and the 
core underwriting resulted in a loss of $73.4 million for 1998 with catastrophe losses 
totaling $36 million.  CEO Ray Williams claimed that 90% of the 2.5% increase in the 
group’s combined ratio (a measure of claims and expenses to net earned premium) was 
attributable to the catastrophe claims.  The group’s combined ratio grew from 102.7% to 
105.2%.  FAI Insurance recorded an unaudited loss of $50-$60 million for the six months 
to December and suffered a $22 million loss on investments for the first quarter.  Despite 
this, by the end of March 1999, HIH’s earnings potential had received an upward rating 
by stock analysts. 
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However, the credit quality of HIH had already been downgraded from A to A- by 
Standard and Poors in January 1999 due to concerns over the acquisition of FAI.  HIH 
attempted to allay the fears of the rating agencies by issuing subordinated debt with 
quasi-equity characteristics because it hoped to neutralize rating agencies’ concerns about 
its indebtedness, while also addressing shareholders’ concerns of dilution by a straight 
equity issue.  
Yet, losses continued to mount during the year and the stock price continued to 
drop.  By June, shares had slipped below the $2 mark.  Then in August, HIH posted a 
$58.8 million loss for the first six months of 1999.  Two losses stood out at this time - a 
$50.1 million loss on the sale of FAI’s former asset, Oceanic Coal, and a $50 million 
abnormal loss related to the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST) that 
would take place in Australia on July 1, 2000.  Despite these losses, HIH still intended to 
pay dividends and, according to media reports, was aiming at a 70% to 80% payout ratio. 
Analysts had determined that HIH would have to generate at least $80 million in retained 
earnings in order to make this dividend payment.   During this period, HIH changed its 
financial year-end from December 31 to June 30, justifying the decision because of the 
need to standardize internal reporting periods following the takeover of FAI Insurance so 
that investors could make more meaningful comparisons with competitors. 
At the start of 2000, HIH benefited by offloading part of its stake in the telephone 
company One.Tel for about $35 million (One.Tel would also later collapse in 2001).  In 
January, the company also sold part of its business in Argentina and ceased to be a 
substantial shareholder in a number of companies.  Also in January, HIH decided to sue 
former clients in order to recover an alleged overpayment of funds.  
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Reported profits for the last two quarters of 1999 exceeded expectations by about 
$10 million.  HIH pointed to an improved underwriting result, $25 million in cost savings 
from the integration of FAI Insurance, and disposal of that acquisition’s last major non-
core asset as reasons for the improvement.  However, reinsurance, which represented 5% 
of HIH’s business, contributed a $16.6 million loss as a result of exposure to the 
European windstorms in December.  Standard and Poors  confirmed HIH’s credit rating 
of A- in February. 
As the year progressed, so did the negative news events for HIH.  At the end of 
May, HIH denied claims that it had withheld from its shareholders relevant information 
about two takeover offers and a potentially expensive indemnity case. By the middle of 
June 2000, HIH shares were trading at half the price they had been twelve months earlier. 
HIH management attributed the drop in share price as an irrational response to negative 
publicity aimed at HIH Insurance in the media.  At the end of June, analysts expressed 
concerns regarding HIH’s ability to pay its claims.  In July HIH suffered more profit 
downgrades by analysts based on concerns of lower investment income and an 
expectation that predicted premium rate increases would not occur. 
Several news events continued the decline of HIH’s stock price.  On September 
11, HIH shares were suspended from trading as the company delayed its profit 
announcement.  Three days later, two news events caused a further 20% slide in stock 
price.  First, reported financial results for the first two quarters of 2000 were far worse 
than expected by analysts.  Second, HIH announced a deal to sell its personal lines 
business to German insurer Allianz.  The terms were that 51% would be owned by 
Allianz and 49% by HIH.  HIH would receive $200 million at the time of the deal and 
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proportional earnings for up to five years.  After the five years Allianz would have an 
option to buy HIH’s interest, while HIH could sell its 49 percent interest at any time 
during the following five years for $125 million. 
The negative market reaction stemmed from investors’ belief that HIH was selling 
its best assets – its personal lines business.  Although this action would return HIH to its 
original focus of corporate insurance, analysts were concerned about the long-term 
viability of the company and grew suspicious of its accounting practices.  HIH shares 
slumped another 30% the day after these announcements.  
In order to support the stock during this downfall, CEO Williams bought 1.05 
million shares and another board member bought 227,000 shares.  At about the same 
time, director and former FAI CEO Rodney Adler began selling shares. 
The stock’s decline was not reversed by Williams’ stock purchases or his strategic 
decisions and so he tendered his resignation on October 12. The company concurrently 
announced other restructuring moves, including that Australian executives would no 
longer sit on the board of HIH, reducing the size of its board from 11 to 7.  The reason 
cited was that such a change was aimed at increasing the independence of the board.  The 
capital markets greeted this news favorably and Adler continued selling shares soon 
thereafter. 
Some media outlets began speculating that HIH’s crisis was linked to the FAI 
takeover from two years prior. Apparently, no formal review of FAI’s books occurred 
before HIH launched its $300 million takeover. Instead, the decision to buy FAI was 
based on a review of publicly available information such as annual reports and company 
results without a due diligence effort.  After the takeover of FAI, HIH shut down several 
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of FAI’s insurance books. However, in the two-year period subsequent to the takeover, 
claims from those books had swollen to approximately $400 million, indicating that FAI 
was effectively insolvent when HIH bought it. 
In November Standard and Poors dropped the credit rating of HIH from A- to 
BBB+ - attributing the downgrade to a lower quality balance sheet that had emerged as a 
result of the deterioration in the FAI book of business and poor underwriting performance 
in HIH’s UK and US operations.  In response to the downgrade, HIH constructed a 
revival plan that included abandoning its loss-making U.S. workers’ compensation 
business and placing its Asian operation (estimated to be worth $80-$90 million) up for 
sale. Once the restructuring was completed, HIH consisted of: the Australian corporate 
insurance line, a minority stake in the Allianz joint venture and business in New Zealand 
and London. 
A new CEO, Randolph Wein (former head of Asian Operations), was announced 
on December 15, 2000. At the shareholders meeting, investors jeered the former CEO 
when it was announced he would receive an estimated $5 million payout. In February 
2001, the new CEO announced a flatter management structure for HIH Insurance. 
Rodney Adler, who had sold the last of his shareholdings in late December 2000, 
resigned at the end of February, 2001. The Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) announced an investigation of his share trading shortly afterwards. 
WorldCom Chairman and CEO Bernard Ebbers also negotiated a multimillion 
dollar severance package when he was forced to resign in the months preceding the 
bankruptcy.  WorldCom also later announced that the board had previously approved a 
multimillion dollar loan from the firm to Ebbers.  While not illegal at the time, approval 
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of loans of this magnitude to a company executive called into question the fiduciary 
responsibility of the board. 
Shares in HIH were suspended on February 22, 2001 and again on February 27, 
2001. Standard and Poors lowered HIH’s credit rating from BBB+ to BBB- and retained a 
credit watch on the company. The Australian Securities and Investment Commission 
(ASIC) also launched an investigation into HIH’s market disclosure. Amongst 
speculation that HIH’s half-year loss to December would be between $100 and $500 
million, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) commenced delisting talks with HIH at 
the start of March 2001. 
On March 7, HIH announced that it had sold a majority part of its corporate 
insurance operation to insurer QBE, who would effectively pay $36 million for the right 
to 60% of HIH’s $600 million in premiums. What QBE would not take on was HIH’s 
liabilities. Allianz bought the remainder of HIH’s retail venture for $125 million and 
NRMA bought HIH’s worker’s compensation business for $130 million.  On March 12, 
2001 the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) announced that it had 
already provided notice to HIH as to why it should be investigated. Amongst estimates of 
a half-year loss of $800 million, HIH put itself into provisional liquidation on March 15, 
2001 and representatives from KPMG were appointed liquidators to the company and 17 
of its controlled entities. A temporary form of administration, provisional liquidation 
gives a company time for the provisional liquidators to review a corporation’s operations 
and assess its financial position. 
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Figure 1 displays the share price for the period 1992-2001.  Data for the 
Australian Insurance sector index and the Australian All Ordinaries Index are also 
contained in Figure 1. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
4.  Corporate Governance Issues 
Previous research links general corporate and insurance failures to unsupervised 
delegation of authority, rapid expansion, underpricing, reserve problems, false reporting, 
reckless management, rapid expansion, and incompetence.  In this section we examine 
the legal and organizational framework, including the principles and processes, by which 
HIH was governed. In addition, we also focus on the accountability and relationships of 
key participants in the direction and control of the company - the board of directors and 
management. First of all, we will describe the legal and regulatory framework in which 
an Australian insurance firm, like HIH, operates. 
 
4.1 The Regulatory Environment of the Australian Insurance Industry 
The Australian insurance industry is regulated by Federal, State and Territory 
legislation. The Federal regulatory structure is made up of three key authorities: the 
Treasury, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) and the Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC). The Treasury sets regulatory policy 
including drafting legislation. Prudential regulation of the industry is undertaken by 
APRA and market conduct is regulated by ASIC. 
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APRA first became aware of HIH’s aggressive accounting in 2000 when a former 
HIH finance executive, Jeff Simpson, provided a report that essentially stated that HIH 
was already financially insolvent.  Simpson noted that the APRA appeared understaffed 
and under-skilled (Main, 2002b).  Inquiries after the HIH collapse noted that Arthur 
Andersen approved HIH’s financial statements knowing that large losses were not being 
reported (Sykes, 2002a). The situation is similar to that in the US where several corporate 
failures of firms audited by Arthur Andersen could not be pre-empted by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) because of their claimed understaffing. 
ASIC’s responsibility in regard to HIH deals primarily with the public disclosure 
of financial reports, corporate executive conduct, and the conduct of market participants.  
Although ASIC has not to date aggressively pursued the potentially fraudulent financial 
reporting of HIH and FAI, Rodney Adler has faced prosecution and investigation in 
regards to corporate misconduct and insider trading.  
Before it can launch a formal investigation into a business, APRA must give and 
insurer 14 days notice.  APRA allegedly gave HIH notice on March 1, 2001 that it was 
preparing an investigation – a decision triggered by HIH’s failure to file its December 
report.  On March 14, HIH went to the Supreme Court and placed itself into provisional 
liquidation without prior notice to APRA.  On the next day the APRA investigation 
began. 
 
4.2 Board Structure and Compensation 
A cornerstone of corporate governance is an understanding of the powers, 
accountability and relationships of those who participate in the direction and control of a 
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company. The participants include the board of directors and management. As of 
September 2001, Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Listing Rule 4.10.3 requires that a 
listed company’s annual report contain a statement of the main corporate governance 
practices it has in place.  
In addition to executive directors, an Australian board of directors may include 
non-executive directors. The main role of the executive directors is to carry out day-to-
day management of the company’s business. Consequently, executive directors are 
usually full-time employees of a company and are usually its senior management. 
Executive directors also have directorial duties of the company and may also have 
additional duties as part of their employment contract. On the other hand, non-executive 
directors are not employed by the company and are engaged on a part-time basis. Rather 
than focused or specialized in any particular area of a company’s operations, the non-
executive director is intended to have a broad and independent view of the company’s 
operations.  
Farrar (1999) examined the corporate governance practices of the top 100 listed 
Australian companies. He found that all the companies surveyed stated whether directors 
were executive or non-executive. Farrar also found that the average board size was 9.6 
members, comprising 2.2 executive directors and 7.4 non-executive directors. The 2000 
Korn/Ferry Report states that Australian boards were made up of an average of five non-
executive and two executive directors.  This board structure is similar to that found in 
Anglo-American firms.9 
“Corporate Practices and Guidelines” claims that independence is more likely to 
be assured if the director is not a substantial shareholder of the company, is not retained 
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as a professional adviser by the company, is not a significant supplier to or customer of 
the company, has not been employed by the company within the last few years, and has 
no significant contractual relationship with the company otherwise than as a director. Of 
concern in the case of HIH Insurance was that it was led by its founders and non-
executive board member, Rodney Adler, who was the son of the founder of FAI 
Insurance, the company that has been referenced as a determining factor in the collapse 
of the HIH Group. 
Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) explain that using independent directors is one 
element of a broader tapestry of monitoring devices and rules which serve to reduce 
agency costs in a corporation. Lawrence and Stapledon use Australian data and find that 
independent directors do not appear to have added value in the period 1985-1995.  
Stapledon and Lawrence (1996) investigate the issue of independent directors in 
an Australian context. The disadvantages of independent directors include: some 
independent directors are still too closely allied to management, their position is 
weakened where the chairperson is not an independent director, they lack detailed 
knowledge of the company’s business, they have limited time to spend on the 
directorship and they are sufficiently linked with shareholders. 
{Are these citations and interpretations correct?  Some of the verbage 
appears contradictory} 
According to the Korn/Ferry Report, the average remuneration for non-executive 
directors in Australian listed companies was $A52,760 as of 2000.  As can be seen in 
Table 3, the direct compensation of the directors of HIH was well above this average.  
Additionally, several directors held substantial equity stakes in the firm.  Of course, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
9 See Yermack (). 
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linking director remuneration to share price presents a number of inherent dangers.  For 
one, it can lead to a disproportionate focus on short-term performance and pre-occupation 
with supporting the share price.  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
4.3 Accounting Issues 
The Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB) sets the accounting 
standards for Australian companies. According to AASB standards, companies must 
provide in their annual report a profit and loss statement, a balance sheet and a statement 
of cash flows.  Under AASB standards, the financial statements must indicate a “true and 
fair view” of the financial position and performance of the company.  An Australian 
company also has various semiannual reporting obligations.  The law after July 1, 1998 
also requires that a company’s annual financial report (or its concise version) must be 
audited and lodged with the Australian Securities and Investment Commission within 
three months of the end of the financial year. 
The case of HIH also refocused attention on the controversial issue of the 
independence of the auditors from their clients.  The board of HIH had three former 
partners of Arthur Andersen, HIH’s auditor.  In October 2000, the auditor signed off on 
HIH’s financial statements, indicating the company had assets of $8.32 billion against 
liabilities of $7.38 billion, giving it net assets of approximately $940 million.  Andersen 
received $1.7million for its work as auditor to the HIH group for the 12 months ended 
June 30, 2000.  
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In retrospect, certain items on HIH Insurance Group’s balance sheet requires 
further scrutiny.  Shareholders’ funds in the 2000 annual report were estimated to be 
$939 million, but the supporting were of suspect value.  In the 2000 annual report HIH’s 
assets included intangibles of approximately $500 million, the bulk of which represented 
goodwill for FAI.  On the liabilities side, there was approximately $500 million in 
borrowings.  The substantial amount of debt carried by HIH is troubling.  An insurance 
company’s investment portfolio holds the premiums the company collects from its policy 
holders and generates investment income as an internal source of capital.  Thus, there is 
little reason for an insurance company to seek external debt except for one-time purposes 
such as a takeover.  Compared with the previous year, HIH’s debt had risen by $170 
million in 1999-2000 (a nearly 50% increase).  According to its cash flow statements, 
HIH’s premium income dropped 15%, or $486 million. 
The HIH offer for FAI Insurance was at a 43% premium to FAI’s market 
capitalization.  Of the $300 million HIH paid for FAI, $157 million was for net assets and 
$143 came in the form of goodwill.  By June 30, 2000, HIH’s goodwill had increased to 
$555.9 million and analysts estimated that $405.3 million of that total was related to FAI 
assets.  Thus, within 18 months of FAI takeover, the net assets acquired from FAI were 
valued at a loss of over $100 million.  This prompted the managers of HIH to consider 
legal action to determine if the financial position of FAI had been intentionally overstated 
at the time of the acquisition.  Interestingly, FAI also used had Andersen as its auditor. 
FAI was not the sole contributing factor to HIH’s growing problems.  On the 
reinsurance side, according to press reports, by June 2000, HIH had run out of 
reinsurance cover and presumably did not have a sufficient prudential margin nor 
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sufficient assets to cover its claims.  HIH’s expansion into the competitive Lloyd’s 
market (with losses of approximately $150 million) and US workers’ compensation 
sector are other possible reasons.  One accounting issue that received some scrutiny from 
analysts was the decision by HIH to treat its increase in reserving as a goodwill item.  
While an acceptable accounting treatment, such a practice would be reflected in a 
company’s profit and loss statement under more conservative accounting practices. 
The main concern with insurance companies’ published accounts is with their 
reserving, or the amount that the insurer shows as its liability for outstanding claims. 
Three of the most important factors include the actuary’s estimate of the dollar value of 
future claims (based on claims experience and probability), the inflation rate by which 
that estimate may be increased, and the interest rate at which the estimate should be 
discounted.  Clearly, this calculation is open to some educated guesswork and 
subjectivity.  Once the insurance company has calculated its outstanding claims in the 
manner described it will normally add a prudential margin of 10% to 25%.  HIH did not 
add this prudential margin to their reserve balance.  This practice made HIH look 
stronger than its industry peers allowing a stronger credit rating until the string of 
catastrophic events depleted its shallow reserves.   
Another subjective accounting practice potentially abused by the managers of 
HIH is how the actuarial assumptions of outstanding claims are determined.  A small 
change in interest rates or assumptions about claims frequency can make large 
differences to the present value of outstanding claims, in turn changing the net assets of 
the insurance company quite dramatically.  The rate of interest is important particularly 
when it is compounded over long periods.  For example, the lower the inflation rate and 
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the higher the discount rate used, the lower the dollar value will be of the outstanding 
claims.  In the case of HIH Insurance, the inflation rate estimate for 2000 was 3.8%, 
down from the 1999 estimate of 5% (see Table 4).  The discount rate HIH used in 2000 
was 6.4% versus 6.1% for 1999.  This 1.5% increase in the gap could have reduced 
claims reserves by as much as $100 million.  Revising the two adjustments to the 
inflation rate and discount rate alone would have wiped out $360 million of HIH’s 
shareholders’ funds.  Thus, these minor movements in rates could have artificially 
inflated the capital base by more than one third. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Again, the parallel situation existed at WorldCom.  The aforementioned 
aggressive turned fraudulent accounting practices at WorldCom allowed them to maintain 
their investment grade debt rating and issue a US$__+ million bond issue in the year 
before the bankruptcy.  An internal auditor found the accounting fraud after the 
resignation of Ebbers and reported it to the board who eventually investigated the fraud.  
Arthur Andersen never uncovered the fraud, but did receive US$___ million in 
consulting fees from WorldCom in the year before the bankruptcy.  In both cases, debt 
was increased as a source of capital on the basis of inflated accounting numbers and lofty 
bond ratings. 
 
5 Conclusion 
The bankruptcies of HIH and WorldCom demonstrate that certain corporate 
governance failures are common across different corporate governance systems.  Both 
were the largest bankruptcies in their respective countries and the factors that led to both 
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failures were relatively the same – a rapid acquisition program, one large problematic 
acquisition, aggressive and/or fraudulent accounting, increased leverage obtained on the 
basis of inflated accounting numbers, and a lack of independence with respect to the 
board of directors and auditors.   
In the wake of these bankruptcies, the regulatory agencies in both countries are 
taking a more proactive role in overseeing corporate governance.  The Australian 
government established a rescue package to compensate resident individuals and small 
businesses.  In addition, the Australian government announced a Royal Commission to 
report on the HIH failure. At the time of this writing, the HIH Royal Commission was 
still in progress. However, in the meantime civil proceedings had been brought against 
three directors (Rodney Adler, Ray Williams, and Dominic Fodera). All were found to 
have breached their duties as directors under the Corporations Act. Adler and Williams 
were jointly held liable to pay compensation of more than $7 million and were banned 
from being involved in company management for terms of 20 years and 10 years 
respectively. 
In the United States, criminal charges have been brought against WorldCom 
controller ____ and CFO Scott Sullivan.  At the time of this writing, ___pled guilty to 
accounting fraud.  This bankruptcy, along with other high profile corporate governance 
failures that led to bankruptcies at Enron, Global Crossing, and Adelphia, sparked a 
movement towards tighter monitoring of the corporate governance mechanisms in place 
in the US.  Namely, the Sarbanes-Oxley bill requires the independence of auditors by 
disallowing auditing firms from offering consulting services to their clients.  Also, the 
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New York Stock Exchange and Securities and Exchange Commission have enacted more 
stringent corporate governance practices. 
This case illustrates how corporate failures are inextricably linked to corporate 
governance failures, regardless of the corporate governance system in place.  We show 
that the major factors to the bankruptcies of HIH and WorldCom were corporate 
governance failures – too rapid of an acquisition program, poor integration of a takeover 
target, accounting malfeasance, and a lack of board and auditor independence.  While 
market conditions did play a role in the demise of these companies, many of their 
competitors remain.  Thus, these bankruptcies were less a result of economic Darwinism 
than preventable breaches of proper corporate governance.  As these abuses span 
different corporate governance systems, they are not the result of the system at hand and 
may be addressed internationally.  As the same corporate governance abuses occur 
repetitively, the confidence of all investors is undermined and international economic 
interests are at stake, not just individual companies and their shareholders. 
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Table 1 
Panel A 
Classification of Licensed Private Sector Insurers and Reinsurers inside Australia 
Year: 2000 
 
Type of Insurer Number of Insurers 
Direct Underwriters 104 
Mortgage Insurers 17 
Captive Insurers 6 
Reinsurers 30 
s.37 exempt Insurers 4 
Total 161 
 
 
Panel B 
Summary Statistics for the Australian Insurance Industry 1999-2000 
       (in Millions $Aust) 
Dec-99 Dec-00 
Premium Revenue $18,379,291 $19,035,745
Less: outwards reinsurance expense 3,935,729 4,757,772 
Net premium revenue 14,443,562 14,277,973 
Claims Expense 20,583,455 17,725,196 
Less: reinsurance and other recoveries revenue 7,144,384 5,715,936 
Net Claims Expense 13,439,071 12,009,260 
Underwriting expenses 3,933,455 3,763,382 
Underwriting result -2,928,964 -1,494,669 
Plus investment revenue rising from:   
Interest 1,384,330 1,491,894 
Dividends 285,193 449,321 
Rent 76,155 52,130 
Plus other revenue 123,977 132,431 
Plus changes in net market value on investments 482,738 1,570,750 
Less general and administration expenses 811,678 669,643 
Profit/loss from general insurance -1,388,249 1,532,214 
Plus: profit/loss from business other than general insurance 30,039 87,439 
Operating profit/loss before extraordinary items and income tax -1,358,210 1,619,653 
Less: income tax expense attributable to operating profit -121,453 100,409 
Operating profit/loss after income tax -1,236,757 1,519,244 
Plus: profit/loss on extraordinary items net of tax -21,535 -34,064 
Operating profit/loss after extraordinary items and income tax -1,258,292 1,485,180 
 
 
Source: Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. Data are in Australian dollars. 
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Table 2 
Chronology of Key Events at HIH Insurance 
 
1968 Ray Williams and Michael Payne establish M W Payne Underwriting Agency Pty Ltd. 
 
1971  M W Payne Underwriting Agency acquired by CE Heath plc of the UK 
 
1980 Ray Williams appointed to board of CE Heath plc 
 
1987 CE Heath plc establishes workers compensation underwriting operation in California 
USA 
 
1989 Business of CE Heath plc transferred to CE Heath International Holdings Ltd (CE 
Heath), with 90% shareholding retained by CE Heath plc 
 
1992 CE Heath lists on the Australian Stock Exchange. This results in 45% of the issued 
capital owned by the public, 44% by CE Heath plc and 11% by CE Heath directors and 
staff.   
 
1993  CE Heath commences operations in the UK. 
 
1994  CE Heath sells its workers compensation underwriting operation in California, USA 
 
1995 CE Heath acquires CIC Insurance Group (“CIC”). CIC Holdings becomes Winterthur 
Holdings Australia Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Winterthur Swiss Insurance 
Company (“Winterthur Swiss”). 
 
1996 CE Heath changes its name to HIH Winterthur International Holdings Limited (“HIH 
Winterthur”). HIH acquires Utilities Insurance. 
 
1997 HIH Winterthur repurchases the workers compensation subsidiary in California, Heath 
Cal, subsequently named HIH America Compensation and Liability Insurance Company 
(“HIH America”). 
 
1997 HIH Winterthur acquires Colonial Ltd General Insurance operations in Australia and 
New Zealand. HIH becomes Australia’s largest writer of bankassurance. 
 
January 1998  HIH Winterthur acquires Solart in Argentina 
 
February 1998 HIH Winterthur establishes representative office in Beijing, China. HIH 
Winterthur acquires minority interest (24.46% stake) in Nam Seng Insurance plc 
of Thailand 
 
April 1998 HIH Winterthur acquires the Cotesworth Group Ltd in London, UK, a managing 
agency of four Lloyds syndicates 
 
June 1998  HIH America acquires Great States Insurance Co of Arizona, USA 
 
July 1998  Winterthur Swiss announces it is selling its 51% shareholding in HIH 
Winterthur to the public. HIH shares trade around $2.85. 
 
August 1998  Sale of shareholding complete 
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September 1998 HIH Winterthur announces proposed takeover of FAI Insurance Ltd.  Adler 
family unloads 14.3% stake. HIH announces it had purchased the Adler family 
stake. Shares trade around $2.50. 
 
September 1998 HIH blacklists stockbroking analysts who disputed the assessment of the 
company. 
 
October 1998  HIH Winterthur becomes HIH Insurance Ltd 
 
January 1999  S&P downgrades HIH’s corporate credit rating from A to A-  
FAI takeover complete. 
 
February 3, 1999  HIH’s converting notes make a strong debut on ASX 
 
March 3, 1999 HIH enters formal negotiations for the sale of its 45% stake in FAI Life. HIH 
posts a 39 per-cent fall in 1998 net profit. 
 
March 4, 1999  HIH announces it has suffered a 39% profit plunge 
 
March 26, 1999  HIH’s earnings potential receives an upward rating by stockbroking analysts 
 
April 1999 As result of Sydney hailstorm, expected total loss of $27 million.   The group 
also estimates its net loss due to reinsurance to be no more than $10 million 
   
April 21, 1999  HIH steps up sale of non-core asset, Oceanic Coal.  Shares fall to $1.99 
 
June 30, 1999  New financial year-end used.  Changed from Dec. 31 to June 30 
 
August 26, 1999  HIH posts $58.8 million loss in the six months to June 
 
September 15, 1999 HIH continues to pay dividends despite heavy losses. However, dividends had 
been slashed in half. 
 
February 1, 2000  HIH ceases to be a substantial shareholder in OAMPS. 
 
February 3, 2000  A- rating confirmed by Standard & Poor's 
 
March 2000  HIH returns to profitability for the first half of 1999/2000. 
 
March 2, 2000 HIH announces plans to develop the St. Moritz Hotel in NY with Millenium 
Partners. 
 
March 3, 2000 HIH sells about half of it St. Moritz investment. 
 
March 28, 2000 HIH takes a 10% stake in Safe Trade, an internet insurer. 
 
March 29, 2000 HIH decreases its interest in Armourglass (from 10.55% to 8.91%). 
 
March 31, 2000 HIH decreases holding in Acclaim Uranium NL (12.10% to 10.8%). 
  
April 5, 2000 HIH decreases it interest in Armourglass (8.91% to 7.64%) 
 
May 8, 2000 HIH decreases it interest in Acclaim Uranium (10.8% to 9.60%) 
 
June 15, 2000 Share price falls to new low of $0.96.   
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June 20, 2000 Announcement that Rodney Adler, an executive non-director had topped up his 
holding in the company to 1.86%  
 
July 1, 2000 Goods and Services Tax (GST) introduced in Australia. 
 
September 2000 Joint venture with Allianz announced. HIH sells part of its domestic personal 
lines to Allianz for $500 million. 
 
September 12, 2000 George Sturesteps and Michael Payne resign as directors of HIH. 
 
October 12, 2000 Dominic Fodera resigns as director of HIH. Also in October, the US business is 
placed in run-off. Ray Williams, CEO, announces his retirement. 
 
November 2000 S&P downgrade HIH credit rating to BBB+. Some Asian operations are also 
sold. HIH also enters managing general agency agreement with Gerling Group. 
 
December 15, 2000 HIH annual general meeting. Ray Williams steps down as director of HIH and 
Randolph Wein is appointed the new CEO. Shareholders call for resignation of 
Rodney Adler from HIH board. 
 
February 22, 2001 ASX trading halt to HIH shares. Speculation that HIH will lose up to 
$500million. 
 
February 26, 2001 HIH resumes trading. Rodney Adler resigns. ASIC raids HIH offices. 
 
February 27, 2001 Trading halted at HIH’s request. ASIC hands HIH documents to ASX. S&P 
lowers HIH Credit rating. 
 
March 1, 2001 HIH shares suspended until interim profit released. 
 
March 6, 2001 QBE forms joint venture with HIH in corporate insurance, takes 60% stake. 
 
March 9, 2001 Allianz buys remainder of retail insurance venture for $125 million. 
 
March 14, 2001 NRMA buys HIH workers’ compensation business for $130 million. 
 
March 15, 2001 HIH puts itself into provisional liquidation and estimates $800 million half year 
loss. 
 
May 16, 2001 ASIC launches its biggest ever investigation, seizing HIH documents. 
 
May 21, 2001 Federal Government announces a Royal Commission into what is at the time 
Australia’s biggest corporate collapse. 
 
Source: Australian Financial Review and HIH Royal Commission Website. 
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Table 3 
HIH Board Composition, Executive Compensation and Executive Shareholdings 
 
1998/1999 Annual Report 
 
Non-Executive Directors Key Announcements Compensation 
($Aust) 
Ordinary  
Shares 
Options Convertible 
Notes 
G.A. Cohen (Chairman)  324,600 55,806  4,260 
C. P. Abbott  204,386 59,647   
R.S. Adler Appointed April 16, 1999 4,311,945 5,500,000   
J.H Gardner Appointed December 2, 
1998 
31,377 46,894   
A. W. Gorrie  200,862    
N.R. Head  142,140    
E.W. Heri Resigned effective October 
15, 1998 
    
M.W. Payne Retired as Executive June 
30, 1998, appointed Non-
Executive July 9, 1998 
271,936 133,611 376,000 8,467 
W.E. Schurpf Resigned effective April 
15, 1998 
    
R.H. Stitt  128,180 40,810  1,129 
Executive Directors Key Announcements Compensation  
($Aust) 
Ordinary  
Shares 
Options Convertible 
Notes 
R. Williams (CEO) and 
Deputy Chairman 
 1,460,350 10,336,383 500,000 19,200 
T. Cassidy  916,777 6,941,213 400,000 10,000 
D. Fodera  799,870 348,871 520,000 5,024 
G. Sturesteps  986,294 6,242,061 320,000 9,700 
H.R. Wein  517,687    
 
For the 1998/1999 annual report there were 12 directors on the board, three less than the maximum number 
provided for under the company’s constitution. 
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1999/2000 Annual Report 
 
Non-Executive 
Directors 
Key Announcements Compensation  
($Aust) 
Ordinary  
Shares 
Options Notes 
G.A. Cohen 
(Chairman) 
 216,090 61,566  4,260 
C. P. Abbott  86,400 209,832   
R.S. Adler  53,000 5,753,670   
J.H Gardner  57,000 112,713   
A. W. Gorrie Resigned November 19, 1999 32,307    
N.R. Head Resigned November 19, 1999 6,796    
M.W. Payne Resigned effective September 12, 2000 133,317    
R.H. Stitt  63,514 140,260  1,129 
Executive 
Directors 
Key Announcements Compensation 
($Aust) 
Ordinary  
Shares 
Options Notes 
R. Williams (CEO) Resigned effective December 15, 2000 1,147,692 12,222,715 500,000 19,200 
T. Cassidy Resigned effective October 12, 2000 671,900    
D. Fodera Resigned effective October 12, 2000. 
Appointed Chief Operating Officer. 
677,128    
G. Sturesteps Resigned effective September 12, 2000 707,286    
H.R. Wein (new 
CEO) 
Appointed new CEO December 15, 2000. 648,328 4,233   
 
For the 1999/2000 annual report, the Board of HIH had seven directors (5 Non-Executives and 2 
Executives), eight less than the maximum number provided for under the company constitution.  
 
On October 13, 2000 it was announced by HIH Chairman Geoffrey Cohen that Australian executives 
would no longer serve on the board. This meant that Terry Cassidy and Dominic Fodera would step down. 
Around this time Dominic Fodera was appointed Chief Operating Officer. 
 
Source: Australian Financial Review and HIH Annual Reports. Data are in Australian dollars. 
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Table 4 
 
Financial Highlights at HIH Insurance Group (1996 – 2000) 
 
 
 12 months to 
June 1996 
12 months to 
June 1997 
12 months to 
June 1998 
12 months to 
June 1999 
12 months to 
June 2000 
Premium (revenue 
earned–gross(excl. 
VWA) 
1135.8 1343.0 1841.3 2318.4 2962 
Premium revenue 
earned – net 
888.5 1067.0 1300.5 1662.2 1995.4 
Claims incurred and 
expenses 
905.4 1094.5 1344.8 1808.4 2098.9 
Combined ratio 101.9% 102.6% 103.4% 108.8% 105.2% 
Underwriting 
Profit/Loss 
(16.9) (27.5) (44.3) (146.3) (103.5) 
Goodwill 
amortization 
(4.7) (5.2) (7.3) (17.2) (35.3) 
Interest expense (1.8) (4.8) (4.7) (17.9) (31.5) 
Investment return on 
shareholders’ funds 
26.1 95.8 31.4 71.1 60.4 
Operating Profit after 
income tax, 
abnormal and 
extraordinary items 
59.2 78.3 37.5 (39.8) 18.4 
Dividend/share 
(cents) 
13.0 15.0 16.0 12.0 6.0 
Earnings/share 
(cents) 
20.5 25.6 9.9 (0.4) (0.6) 
Net tangible asset 
backing per share –
diluted * 
1.23 1.38 1.66 1.02 0.67 
Return on Equity 15.4% 16.3% 6.5% -5.0% 2.0% 
 
* Adjusted for full effect of Convertible and Converting Note Issues, where applicable 
 
 
Other Financial Items 
 
 31.12.97 30.6.99 30.6.00 
Inflation Rate (%) 5.0 5.0 3.8 
Discount Rate (%) 6.2 6.1 6.4 
    
Outstanding Claims Details    
Expected Future claim payments (undiscounted) $2,377.3 $4,4598.7 $4,922.9 
Liability for Outstanding Claims (Aust$m) $1,956.6 $4,051.5 $4,430.9 
 
According to the HIH annual report, the weighted average expected term to settlement from the balance 
date of the outstanding claims is estimated to be 2.6-2.7 years. The inflation and discount rates displayed 
were used in measuring the consolidated outstanding claims liability for the succeeding and subsequent 
years. 
 
Source: HIH annual report. 
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Adler was later convicted in a suit by the Australian Securities and Investment 
Commission (ASIC) for breaching his duty as a corporate officer in regards to a 
fraudulent $10 million loan made by HIH to Pacific Eagles Equity.  The conviction 
carries a fine and a twenty year suspension from directorship of a company (Zenoni, 
2002).  Further questions emerged as to the solvency of FAI at the time of the acquisition 
as well as allegations of insider trading 
